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Remarks on a Complex Convergence 
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In 2007, the International Court of Justice declared that States have a duty to prevent genocide from 
occurring in another State since the prevention and punishment of genocide is a concern of every State and of 
the International Community as a whole. The doctrine of the responsibility to protect will be analysed in the 
light of the erga omnes and erga omnes partes character of the rules embodied in the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It is argued that, even though there are differences 
between the Court’s decisions about genocide and the applicable regime regarding the consequences of 
serious violations of erga omnes obligations, however they are both consonant with the doctrine of the 
responsibility to protect since they are both inspired by the need to guarantee the protection of fundamental 
legal values.
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21. Introduction
Genocide is considered one of the most heinous international crimes; consequently, the whole 
International Community has an interest both in punishing and preventing it. This responsibility lies 
primarily within every single State that has the duty not to commit genocide. One of the most 
serious problems is that States have limited means to prevent the occurrence of genocide in another 
country due to international law constraints that protect State sovereignty. However, it is 
indisputable that the commission of genocide violates legal interests that concern every State and 
respect for which is considered a fundamental value for the International Community. The doctrine 
of the responsibility to protect emphasises the collective dimension of the duties to prevent and 
punish genocide; the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 2007 Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro case (‘Bosnian Genocide case’) has asserted this collective dimension as 
well.1
Even if genocide is not so frequent an occurrence as some believe, the problematic nature of 
reactions to genocide is not an obsolete academic issue: for instance, the United Nations (UN) 
acknowledged that in the ongoing crisis in the Middle East the self-proclaimed Islamic State likely 
committed genocide against religious minorities.2 Therefore, even in order to build a more efficient 
strategy against the Islamic State, an analysis of the relations between the duties to prevent and 
punish genocide and the doctrine of the responsibility to protect in light of the law on obligations 
erga omnes can be useful.
2. A Brief Overview on the ICJ Case Law
Two Separate and Autonomous Duties to Prevent and Punish Genocide
The Bosnian Genocide case clarified the normative content of Article 1 of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (‘Genocide Convention’ or ‘Convention’), 
according to which ‘The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of 
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to 
punish’.3 The ICJ has been involved in this ‘fascinating judicial saga’4 arising from the Convention 
on a number of occasions. In 1951, the Court rendered a famous advisory opinion on Reservations 
to Genocide Convention stressing the importance of the humanitarian and civilizing purposes of the 
Convention.5 Then in 1993, it also passed two orders of provisional measures6 followed by a 
judgment on preliminary objections in 1996.7 More recently, the ICJ passed another judgment on 
the application of the Convention in 2015.8 
Many international lawyers have commented on the Bosnian Genocide case as it presents 
several interesting legal aspects.9 However, for the purposes of the present essay, the ICJ’s decision 
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independent from the duty to punish it. 
Duties to prevent wrongful acts are not new in international law,10 but this case represents the 
first time that the ICJ made a clear distinction between the duty to punish and the duty to prevent 
genocide based on Article 1 of the Convention. The ICJ affirmed that this provision includes two 
separate but connected obligations, the duty to punish and the duty to prevent genocide;11 
accordingly, Article 1 is comprised of three elements: the qualification of genocide as an 
international crime both in times of peace and of war, the duty to prevent genocide, and the duty to 
punish it should prevention fail.12 Punishment naturally implies a failure of the Convention, given 
that a genocide occurred and a number of people lost their lives; consequently, preventing genocide 
is extremely more satisfactory than punishing the perpetrators.13 
According to the ICJ, the duty to prevent is an obligation of conduct and not a duty of result.14  
States must do everything they can – including modifications to their own domestic laws – in order 
to prevent the commission of genocide. In case of failure, States will not be held automatically 
responsible for lack of prevention, but will be provided the opportunity to demonstrate that they had 
used the due diligence required by the Convention.15
In one of the most challenging parts of its decision,16 the ICJ affirmed that the obligation to 
prevent genocide is territorially unlimited, and therefore a State must prevent genocide also in 
relation to acts committed outside its borders,17 that is affirming that States have a duty to interfere 
in the sovereign sphere of another State that is about to commit genocide or to tolerate genocide 
taking place in its territory.
Extraterritorial application of certain treaties is not something new in the international law 
discourse. Although normally conventions bind States only for actions that occur within a particular 
State’s borders, treaties bind States extraterritorially where a member State exercise its own 
jurisdiction outside its borders.18 Often treaties embody jurisdictional clauses that explain when and 
where a State party is bound by the provision of the convention. Similar clauses are based on the 
concept of State jurisdiction over individuals or territory and can be found for instance in Article 2 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in Article 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. By contrast, there is no such clause in the Genocide Convention; 
however, absence of such a clause is not a hindrance for its extraterritorial application since the 
ICJ’s jurisprudence admits that even conventions without jurisdictional clauses can be applied 
extraterritorially following the State party’s jurisdiction.19 
The ICJ’s conclusion on the extraterritorial application of the duty to prevent genocide is a 
novelty, however, since the obligations that arise from the Convention are not triggered by the 
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genocidal intent and course of action,20 a totally new criterion.21 Because it is not easy to grasp the 
precise legal meaning of influence, a standard which is characterised by a clear factual nature that 
changes in relation to different circumstances, the possible behaviours of States cannot be identified 
once and for all,22 but rather should be asserted case-by-case on the basis of their ‘capacity to 
influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide’.23
The capacity to influence the perpetrators of genocide is the result of several qualitative and 
quantitative elements; with scant regard to accuracy,24 the Court mentions the spatial proximity and 
geopolitical links as relevant factors, but the meaning of this statement is actually ‘rather obscure’.25 
The result of this decision is that different States equally bound by the Convention are subject to the 
duty to prevent genocide in different ways, according to the principle that the more a State can do, 
the more it is expected. The ICJ thus broadened the scope of the duty to prevent genocide in relation 
to acts that occurred in another State’s territory, while at the same time narrowing it by stressing 
that the duty to prevent does not have the same intensity for all the member States in order to avoid 
giving the impression that powerful States are always responsible for lack of prevention (since the 
Great Powers have sufficient military force to influence events in every corner of the world).26
The Erga Omnes / Erga Omnes Partes Nature of the Duties Embodied in the Convention
On a number of occasions, the ICJ has remarked on the normative structure of the duties arising 
from the Genocide Convention. In the Reservations advisory opinion, it affirmed that the prevention 
and repression of genocide – the pivotal legal interests at the basis of the Convention – are not 
merely a concern of single contracting States, but rather affect the entire group of member States 
simultaneously.27 This dictum was later used in the famous 1970 Barcelona Traction case when, for 
the first time, the ICJ mentioned the existence of the obligations erga omnes, including among them 
the duty to outlaw genocide.28 Two and an half decades later, in 1996, the ICJ clearly stated that all 
the duties arising from Article 1 of the Genocide Convention are obligations erga omnes,29 a 
conclusion that has been reiterated in the 2006 Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo (New Application).30 In the Bosnian Genocide case, the ICJ acknowledged that the 
applicant considered the duties of the Convention to be obligations erga omnes31 and, by not 
challenging this opinion, appeared itself to consider erga omnes the duties to prevent and punish 
genocide, in accordance with its past jurisprudence. More recently, dealing with the problem of the 
nature of the obligations arising from the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the ICJ stated that the obligations contained in the 
Genocide Convention are erga omnes partes.32 Finally, in 2015 the ICJ restated that the obligations 
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Albeit these hints in the ICJ’s case law are not perfectly cohesive, they are fundamental in 
order to understand which acts are permitted to contracting States when another State breaches its 
obligation under the Convention. Because the ICJ is the body institutionally devoted to the 
interpretation and application of the Convention when disputes arise pursuant to Article 9, its role in 
this process should not be underestimated. Slightly different is the situation in relation of the duty to 
prevent genocide qua international customary law, where the ICJ does not have the monopoly of the 
interpretation and application of the law but rather a highly regarded opinion.
According to the ICJ’s dictum in the Barcelona Traction case, obligations erga omnes are 
‘obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole’, and are ‘the concern of all 
States’; consequently, ‘[i]n view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to 
have a legal interest in their protection’.34 Therefore, it is incorrect to say that obligations erga 
omnes are simply binding on all States irrespective of their express will – because this is the 
characteristic of all customary norms.35 The key feature of obligations erga omnes is that all States 
have a legal interest in the respect of these obligations and can put forward a claim in the event of 
violations; in other words, the norms erga omnes protect legal interests that are so relevant for the 
whole International Community that every State is to a certain extent affected by their violation and 
is concerned with their implementation.36 In the past, a violation of this kind of obligations formed 
the basis of the so-called international crimes of States envisaged by the International Law 
Commission in Article 19 of the 1976 Draft of Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
International Wrongful Acts (‘DARSIWA’). More recently, the final 2001 Draft Articles, adopted 
under the direction of Professor James Crawford, centered the special regime of international 
responsibility on the serious breaches of peremptory norms, shifting from obligations erga omnes to 
the jus cogens category that was traditionally envisaged as a limit to States’ treaty-making power.37 
Obligations erga omnes and jus cogens norms are not completely overlapping categories;38 
significantly, the DARSIWA still mentions  erga omnes obligations in Article 48(1)(b), according 
to which ‘obligation[s] […] owed to the international community as a whole’ are relevant for the 
new regime of aggravated international responsibility.39
Obligations erga omnes partes are quite different. This category is formed by norms enshrined 
in multilateral conventions that promote pivotal interests at the basis of the agreement and are not of 
a synallagmatic nature but, rather, are due to the group on States parties to the Convention 
indifferently.40 According to the International Law Commission, an erga omnes partes obligation is 
‘owed to a group of States’ and is ‘established for the protection of a collective interest of the 
group’ at the basis of the decision to conclude a specific agreement.41 Even in this case, the 
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individual States but are concern of an entire group.
After this brief overview, one must verify whether the duty to prevent a genocide that is about 
to be committed or is occurring in the territory of another State is an obligation erga omnes, erga 
omnes partes, or both. Even though the ICJ lacked precision in its use of these categories, on the 
basis of a comparison between the normative structure of the Genocide Convention and the 
Convention against Torture, there is room to argue that all the duties enshrined in Article 1 of the 
Genocide Convention are obligations erga omnes partes. However, this is not an obstacle to 
asserting as well their erga omnes nature in the framework of general international law. The duties 
to prevent and punish genocide are also customary obligations,42 and their structure is obviously 
that of obligations erga omnes since they protect interests that are pertinent to every State of the 
International Community.
As a matter of treaty law, these duties are obligations erga omnes partes. As a matter of 
customary law, they are obligations erga omnes. After all, it is well established in international law 
that the same obligation can be part of both treaty and customary law, even with the coexistence of 
two different normative regimes.43 
3. Obligations Erga Omnes / Erga Omnes Partes Regarding Genocide and the Responsibility to 
Protect
Preliminary Observations
In the  aftermath of the Bosnian Genocide case decision, some legal scholars have stressed that 
the extraterritorial duty to prevent genocide should be considered the legal basis for asserting the 
binding character of the responsibility to protect doctrine, for some of them even as a legal tool to 
justify the use of force with the purpose of saving civilians from mass atrocities.44
In brief, the responsibility to protect is a doctrine based on the idea that sovereignty consists 
principally in the State duty to protect its own population; consequently, if a State does not want or 
cannot protect them, the responsibility for their protection falls upon the International Community, 
institutionally through the UN or upon every State in the case of UN inactivity. For some supporters 
of this doctrine, in the case of mass atrocities (such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing), if the Security Council  does not authorize the use of the force to 
protect civilians, other universal or regional organizations (and, finally, even singular States) could 
attack the perpetrators and put these atrocities to an end.45
Actually, the dream of the responsibility to protect as the legal basis to use the force beyond the 
limits of the UN Charter when the Security Council is blocked by vetoes is not realistic and there is 
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2005, the Generally Assembly endorsed the responsibility to protect only through the use of 
‘appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI 
and VIII of the Charter’,46 excluding the emersion of a new customary rule regarding the use of 
force. State practice confirmed this conclusion in the case of Syria when, in 2013, a number of 
States willing to attack renounced due to the lack of a Security Council authorization.47 Even the 
fact that the 2011 Libyan war was authorized by a Security Council resolution expressly mentioning 
the responsibility to protect did not prove useful for the promotion of this doctrine, given that 
several States disapproved of the attack because it did not merely protect civilians but led to the 
overthrow of the Libyan government. The responsibility to protect gained such a bad reputation in 
the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan war 48 that it has not been invoked in order to justify a military 
intervention since then,49 except in situations clearly illegal such us the Russian annexation of 
Crimea.50
With regard to the possibility that States use force as a means of implementing the duty to 
prevent a genocide, it is fundamental to stress that the ICJ clearly affirmed that ‘[t]he State’s 
capacity to influence must also be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that every State may 
only act within the limits permitted by international law’51 and that States have to ‘take such action 
as they can to prevent genocide from occurring, while respecting the United Nations Charter and 
any decisions that may have been taken by its competent organs’.52 The ICJ openly excluded the 
legality of humanitarian intervention based on the duty to prevent genocide pursuant to the ban on 
the use of force contained in the United Nations Charter.53 Since the ICJ is the ultimate authority on 
the interpretation of the Convention and except for unexpected and unlikely changes in its 
jurisprudence, the duties enshrined in the convention cannot be interpreted in the sense that States 
can use the force outside the framework of the UN Charter. 
Changing perspectives will prove useful in order to address the problem of the interferences 
that States have to or can undertake against another State that is committing or is about to commit 
genocide.
The Erga Omnes Character of the Genocide Convention Duties and Countermeasures
Acknowledging the fact that the Genocide Convention embodies obligations erga omnes partes that 
are also correspondent to customary obligations erga omnes could shed some light on the measures 
available for States willing to stop or prevent a genocide that is occurring in the territory of another 
State.
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serious violation of an obligation erga omnes has been greatly debated. In 2001, the International 
Law Commission seamed to exclude this possibility given that only the State directly injured can 
take countermeasures, whilst other States can only invoke responsibility and, pursuant to Article 54 
of the DARSIWA, ‘take lawful measures [...] to ensure cessation of the breaches and reparation in 
the interest of the injured State.’ According to the commentary on Article 54, State practice in 
favour of countermeasures from States other than the injured is ‘embryonic’ and therefore not 
decisive.54
The authoritative commentary should be analysed alongside the actual practice of States and it 
is necessary to face some issues arising from the drafting of the relevant provisions. First, it has 
been suggested that the ‘legal measures’ of Article 54 are countermeasures; in this context, the 
adjective ‘legal’ does not refer to acts per se licit, but rather to measures that would be illicit except 
for the fact that they are adopted as countermeasures against a wrongful act.55 The opposite 
interpretation, according to which Article 54 refers only to acts that are per se legal, would render 
the provision superfluous because it would only restate the proposition that international law allows 
States to adopt allowed behaviours.56
Second, the practice of countermeasures unilaterally taken in the collective interest, far from 
being nascent, is well-established with regard to peaceful countermeasures. According to State 
practice analysed by several authors, States adopt such countermeasures when a serious breach of 
an obligation erga omnes occurs and consider their response to be legal.57 As a recent example, one 
could consider the international sanctions unilaterally levied against Russia after its annexation of 
Crimea. In the absence of a centralised decision by the Security Council, many Western Countries 
decided to freeze assets and limit commerce in violation of previous international agreements and 
general international law as a reaction to the Russian violation of the Ukrainian territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, even if the only directly affected State was Ukraine; these Western States adopted 
these measures on the basis of the belief that Russia’s actions violated legal interests that are not 
merely conferred to the Ukraine, but that are also pertinent to the International Community as a 
whole.58 Consequently, the position according to which States can adopt pacific countermeasures 
against violations of obligations erga omnes appears well-grounded.59 This same regime should 
apply equally to the case of the preparation or commission of genocide; all the States have an 
interest in preventing the genocide from being committed, and, therefore, they should be able to 
take every peaceful measure available, even if such measures might otherwise violate other 
international law rules. 
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duty but a faculty of taking actual measures in order to prevent genocide. There is therefore room to 
argue that the duty to prevent genocide encompasses only lawful measures but that, at the same 
time, States can – and not must – take countermeasures pursuant to the erga omnes character of the 
customary duty to prevent genocide. 
The matter is far more complex with regard to measures involving the use of force. Due to the 
general ban on the use of force in both conventional and customary international law, several 
commentators argue that States cannot adopt coercive countermeasures in order to put an end to the 
atrocities without a Security Council authorization, even in the case of a serious breach of 
obligations erga omnes, such as those embodied in the Genocide Convention.60 However, the 
paralysis of the Security Council has hindered States’ ability to respond to atrocities in the past. For 
instance, the Security Council’s failure to pass a resolution in response to mass atrocities committed 
in Kosovo in 1999 brought some States to respond by attacking Serbia in operations conducted 
without UN authorization. After this crucial episode, Professor Antonio Cassese affirmed that 
[T]his particular instance of breach of international law may gradually lead to the crystallization of a 
general rule of international law authorizing armed countermeasures for the exclusive purpose of putting an 
end to large-scale atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity and constituting a threat to the peace 
[…] It would amount to an exception similar to that laid down in Article 51 of the Charter (self-defence).61
Professor Cassese was focused on a de jure condendo trend rather than clearly affirming the 
state of the law, but there is room for a broader debate. 
Professor Paolo Picone, who has studied this issue in depth, believes that Article 51 codifies a 
forcible countermeasure against the specific violation of the ban on aggression that is an obligation 
erga omnes, the only breach of an obligation erga omnes that was clearly known when the UN 
Charter was adopted: countermeasures in response to genocide and other mass atrocities were not 
mentioned in the Charter simply because, at that time, States were not aware that a violations of 
these fundamental norms would affect the legal interests of every State and of the International 
Community as a whole; however, State practice has evolved and relevant events (culminating with 
the attack in Kosovo) tend to show that, in the case of paralysis of the Security Council and when 
international customary law allows such responses, as a last resort against a serious breach of 
obligations erga omnes, States can adopt forcible countermeasures that, although untied to the UN 
Charter, rather find their legitimisation in general international law62 and fit into the definition of 
legal measures provided by Article 54 of the DARWISA.63 However, the possibility of taking 
forcible countermeasures against a serious breach of an obligation erga omnes is constrained by 
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several factors that should safeguard against abuses: the force employed should be necessary and 
proportionate, the action should respect international humanitarian law, and the action should end 
when the Security Council proves itself willing and capable of dealing with the situation.64 This 
solution is particularly fit for cases in which there is not a State directly injured in the sense of the 
DARSIWA because the author of the atrocities is the government that should react as injured State 
according to the same Articles.65 Accordingly, the recent intervention of a coalition of Western 
States in Syria against the Islamic State, which is not justified by the request of the Syrian 
government, can be considered as the collective response to the violation of many erga omnes 
obligations perpetrated by the jihadists.66 
This fascinating theoretical construction has the value to envisage a response to mass atrocities 
that is based on legal argumentation and not on the moral evaluations at the basis of the traditional 
humanitarian intervention.67 However, there are some elements of the practice and opinio juris that 
are not consistent, for instance, the large consensus on the definition of aggression adopted in 2010 
in Kampala during the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
which appears to be a manifestation of the International Community’s belief that, even in the most 
tragic situations, force can be used only in ways allowed by the UN Charter.68 Consequently the 
issue of forcible measures deserves further analysis beyond the scope of this essay. Regarding the 
specific breach of the obligations erga omnes related to genocide, though, State practice is thin and 
insufficient to conclude that general international law allows forcible countermeasures in this 
specific case, which is almost unchartered water since, fortunately, genocides have not been 
frequent in the recent past.
In conclusion,  the erga omnes character of the duty to prevent genocide clearly allows States 
to adopt peaceful countermeasures in order to prevent or effectively repress at an early stage a 
genocide occurring in another State’s territory, in accordance with the doctrine of responsibility to 
protect. By contrast, State practice related to the possibility of adopting forcible countermeasures 
for the prevention of genocide is still uncertain and it is highly doubtful whether force can be used 
beyond the limits of the UN Charter in this specific case.   
Procedural Consequences of the Erga Omnes / Erga Omnes Partes Qualification
The erga omnes / erga omnes partes character of the duty to prevent genocide also has relevant 
procedural consequences that will be examined here very briefly.69
The ICJ, on the basis of the erga omnes partes character of the obligations embodied in the 
Convention against Torture, affirmed the jus standi of all the States members to the treaty when a 
serious violation occurs, irrespective of any special position as affected States.70 In addition, the 
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Marshall Islands claim their jus standi in a number of  recent cases pending before the ICJ on the 
erga omnes partes character of the obligations embodied in Article 6 of the 1968 Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and in the erga omnes character of the alleged corresponding customary 
norm;71 the cases are still pending an in the due time the ICJ might rule on these issues, if it will 
find that it has jurisdiction on these cases.72
The acknowledgement of the jus standi is something less relevant than the opportunity to take 
countermeasures73 because a controversy on genocide can only be triggered after the failure of the 
prevention, when the genocide has been committed and the International Community has failed to 
prevent it. However, the erga omnes partes qualification of the duty to prevent genocide could be 
useful in the future for assessing the admissibility of a claim brought by any member State to the 
Genocide Convention before the ICJ pursuant to Article 9. It could be argued that all contracting 
States can be considered parties to any dispute arising from the Convention thanks to the erga 
omnes partes nature of its provisions despite the unlikelihood of the ICJ recognizing jus standi of 
every State when an erga omnes obligation has been breached.
4. Conclusive remarks
After having briefly discussed the Bosnian Genocide case, the differences between obligations erga 
omnes and erga omnes partes and the issue of countermeasures as an effective response to mass 
atrocities, there is room to argue that there is a strong interplay between the doctrine of the 
responsibility to protect and of the obligations erga omnes regime in relation to the duties embodied 
in the Genocide Convention.
Apart from vainly attempting to create new rules on jus ad bello, the doctrine of the 
responsibility to protect aims to change the way in which States think of their sovereignty and 
attribute to the International Community an effective role in the protection of the human rights of 
individuals seriously persecuted by their own State. In this respect, obligations erga omnes allow 
States to intervene at least with peaceful countermeasures against a State that is responsible of mass 
atrocities against its citizens. The consonance between the regime of obligations erga omnes and the 
responsibility to protect is particularly clear in the case of the commission of a genocide, the crime 
of crimes since the conventional obligations arising from the Genocide Convention are erga omnes 
partes and they allow States not directly affected to complain against gross violations before 
competent international courts and tribunals, a goal consistent with the doctrine of the responsibility 
to protect, which aims to monitor the exercise of State sovereignty at an international level. 
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The convergence between responsibility to protect, treaty obligations and obligations erga 
omnes may be relevant in situations like the current fight against the Islamic State even where 
genocide has not been committed or prepared. Other obligations erga omnes are at the basis of the 
responsibility to protect and, at the same time, embodied in conventions that compel States to 
ensure respect of the treaty provisions; this is the case of international humanitarian law rules, 
which have been constantly and brutally violated in Syria and Iraq.74    
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